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Abstract—In this paper we explore two issues: Federated
Identity Management and Context-Aware Services. In the last
decade or so we have seen these two technologies gaining
considerable popularities as they offer a number of benefits
to the user and other stakeholders. However, there are a few
outstanding security and privacy issues that need to be resolved
to harness the full potential of such services. We believe that
these problems can be reduced significantly by integrating the
federated identity architecture into the context-aware services.
With this aim, we have developed a framework for Context-Aware
Federated Services based on the Security Assertion Markup Lan-
guage (SAML) and eXtensible Access Control Markup Language
(XACML) standards. We have illustrated the applicability of our
approach by showcasing some use-cases, analysed the security,
privacy and trust issues involved in the framework and the
advantages it offers.
Keywords-Federated Identity Management, Context-Aware
Services, SAML, XACML, GeoXACML, Attribute Aggregation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last fifteen years or so, we have seen a tremendous
expansion of the Internet and web-enabled online services. To
allow users to access different online services in a seamless
manner while maintaining security and privacy, the concept
of Federated Identity Management (FIM, in short) has been
introduced. It has gained considerable popularities as it offers
a significant number of advantages to different stakeholders
[1]. On the other hand, we have also experienced an incredible
proliferation of smartphones equipped with an array of sensors
in the last decade or so. These devices have been the driving
force behind the ever-increasing popularities of context-aware
services mainly in the form of location-based services. A study
by Oracle predicted $85 billion worth of market share for
context-aware services by 2015 [2]. There are numerous works
that have explored how context can be used to provide online
services. However, there are a few major problems that are
yet to be addressed. Firstly, most of these works mainly focus
on the authentication or the authorisation of users neglecting
other aspects of identity management. In that sense, the issue
of Context-Aware Identity Management has not been explored
in detail. Secondly, the existing works are mostly based on
the SILO Model [3] where the users need to authenticate
themselves, if needed, separately to access each service which
could be quite inconvenient for the user. The usability of such
services could be easily improved by introducing the capability
of federated services allowing users to access services only
with a single authentication using the Singe Sign On (SSO)
feature [1]. Thirdly, the security and privacy issues in the
existing context-aware frameworks have not been addressd
properly, as such, unresolved security and privacy issues need
to be addressed to harness its full potential [4]. Moreover, with
the ever increasing popularities of social network accounts,
user attributes are scattered over different providers. Allowing
users to aggregate attributes from different providers would
enable novel service access scenarios. In this work we will
explore the possibility of combining the attribute aggregation
mechanism with the Context-aware Identity Management to
formulate novel use-case scenarios and show how all these
problems can be tackled effectively using this. The contribu-
tions of this paper are:
• At first, we have provided a concrete definition of
Context-Aware Identity Management and used this to
develop a framework for Context-Aware Federated Ser-
vices. The framework is based on a set of requirements
that, we believe, can improve the usability, security and
privacy of context-aware services.
• We have developed an attribute aggregation mechanism
based on the Identity Proxying model as described in [5]
and integrated this mechanism into our framework.
• We have illustrated a few use-cases to show the applica-
bility and usefulness of our framework.
• Finally, we have investigated how our framework meets
different requirements, discussed the advantages it offers
and compared our framework with existing works against
the set of requirements.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We discuss the
existing work related to this paper in Section II. A short back-
ground on Federated Identity Management is provided in Sec-
tion III. The definition of Context-Aware Identity Management
is formulated in Section IV and a set of different requirements
for a context-aware service is compiled in Section V. Then we
discuss our developed framework in Section VI and illustrate
a few use-cases in Section VII. A brief discussion of different
security, privacy and trust issues regarding our framework, the
advantages it offers, its comparison with existing works and
the scope for future work can be found in Section VIII. We
conclude in Section IX.
II. RELATED WORK
A large number of works can be found in the literature
focusing how contexts can be integrated either into an authenti-
cation framework to authenticate a user or into an authorisation
framework for authorising a user to access a service. There are
only a handful of works that analyse the effect of contexts on
the whole spectrum of identity management. Similarly, there
are also a very few works on attribute aggregation in the setting
of FIM. We discuss each of these aspects in the following
subsections.
A. Context-Aware Authentication
Hayashi et al. present a probabilistic model for choosing an
active authentication factor (No-PIN, PIN and Password) based
on several passive factors (location and time of day) in [6],
where the active factor is chosen based on a specific location
or time. This approach, being only suitable to be used in a
mobile phone, cannot be integrated for web-enabled services.
A framework for authenticating a user based on the proxim-
ity to external sensors is presented in [7]. The authentication
mechanism is activated when a user brings her device near
to the sensor. The authentication is done using certificates
which are passed between the device and the sensor using a
challenge-response protocol. In [8], authors propose a mech-
anism for mutual authentication of users based on contextual
data. The paper does not discuss how their framework can be
integrated for online services.
B. Context-Aware Authorisation
One of the earlier works that proposed how contextual
information can be incorporated for controlling accesses is
called the Generalized Role Based Access Control (or GR-
BAC) [9]. The authors defined environment roles (the time
of day, weather conditions and other spatial and temporal
values) as contexts. One major problem of GRBAC is that
a large number of environment roles make the system difficult
to manage manually. This work also is theoretical in nature
and has not been applied in practical scenarios.
Explaining the need to verify the authenticity and validity
of contextual information, a context sensitive access control
architecture is defined in [10]. The authors achieve these
goals by introducing several external components as well as
outline a detailed protocol flow using their architecture. The
main problem of their proposal is the reliance on several
external parties which may be difficult to implement for
federated services considering different security domains and
trust issues.
Jean-Yves et al. have proposed a model to include contex-
tual information into the authorisation process in highly dy-
namic environments [11]. Contextual information is provided
by observers which are actually different devices. The validity
of the contextual information is verified by a trusted third
party. A user is authorised to perform an operation on the
respective object only if the context is valid.
C. Context-Aware Authentication & Authorisation
In [12], the authors have presented an agent-based frame-
work for authentication and access control in context-aware
services using an additional entity called the authentication and
access control agent which is a trusted third party. The agent
is responsible for collecting contextual data from different
servers, obtaining the user’s identity and attributes from the
IdP, etc. The main problem, again, is the reliance on several
external parties which may be difficult to implement for
federated services.
An interesting work in which contextual information such
as roles and location are used for user authentication can
be found in [13]. The paper uses passive cues (contextual
information namely roles and the location of the user) and
active cues (username/password) for user authentication. The
access control system and the policies are based on the
XACML architecture and the role and location information are
combined to create policies for the XACML system. The role
of the user is retrieved from the system once the authentication
is done and the location of the user is retrieved from a QRCode
(Quick Response Code) that the user scans using a mobile
phone. We have used their work as a basis for our proposed
deployment. However, the major differences between their
work and our deployment are that they did not consider the
usage of federated services and different security and privacy
issues have not been analysed in detail.
D. Context-Aware Identity Management
The only work to discuss the issue of context-awareness in
Identity Management is available in [14] where the authors
have investigated which contextual information constitute the
identity of a user and how can such information be collected
in a standardised way from different sources. The authors also
proposed a novel framework consisting of several external
components to address these issues. Unfortunately, the inclu-
sion of external components makes this framework impractical
to be used with the existing architecture of federated services.
E. Attribute Aggregation
In the traditional identity management, the user can release
attributes only from a single IdP to the SP in a single session.
The Attribute Aggregation is the mechanism which allows a
user to retrieve and combine attributes from multiple IdPs in
a single session. There are different models of attribute aggre-
gation in the setting of FIM such as Application Database,
SP-Mediated, Linking Service, Identity Federation/Linking,
Identity Proxying, Identity Relay and Client-Mediated mod-
els. The models have been analysed in greater detail in
[5], [15], [16]. Among all these models, only the Linking
Service and Identity Federation/Linking models have existing
implementations. However, they require a number of complex
additional pre-steps (e.g. linking different IdPs by the user)
beforehand and have complex trust relationships. Also, the
idea of combining the concept of attribute aggregation with
the context-aware services has not been considered before.
III. FEDERATED IDENTITY MANAGEMENT
A system that is used for managing the user identity is
called an Identity Management System (IMS). Each IMS has
several parties involved which are: Service Provider (SP) or
Relying Party (RP) - an entity that provides services to the
users or to the other SPs, Identity Provider (IdP) - an
entity that provides partial identifiers to the users to enable
them to receive services from a SP and User - an entity
that receives a service from a SP. Among different IMS, the
Federated Identity Management has gained much attention and
popularities.
The FIM is based on the concept of Identity Federation. An
identity federation is a business model in which a group of two
or more trusted parties legally bind themselves with a business
and technical contract to allow a user to access restricted
resources seamlessly and securely from other partners from
different Identity Domains [1], [17]. An identity domain is
the virtual boundary, context or environment in which a digital
identifier is valid [17]. Single Sign On (SSO) is the capability
that allows users to log in to a system in one identity domain
and then access other related but autonomous systems in other
domains without further logins.
A federation can be formed consisting of only one IdP
in an identity domain and more than one SP with each SP
residing in a separate identity domain. Such a federation can be
regarded as the Type 1 Federation. Several Type 1 federations
can be combined to form a larger federated identity domain,
regarded as the Type 2 Federation. The issue of trust is a
fundamental concept in FIM as different autonomous bodies
need to trust each other inside the federation. Such parties
inside a federation are said to form the so-called Circle of
Trust (CoT).
IV. CONTEXT-AWARE IDENTITY MANAGEMENT
In the literature of Context-Aware Services, what the term
Context means is highly debated and it has been defined in
numerous ways. Schilit and Theimer used the term context-
aware for the first time in [18] where they described contexts
as location, identities of nearby people, objects and changes
to those objects. Similarly, Ryan et al. regarded context as
the user’s location, environment, identity and time [19]. We
prefer the definition of context given by Abowd et al. [20] as
it considers the application itself as a context along with other
situational information. Interestingly, the term Context has a
specific meaning in Identity Management. A context in identity
management is the application domain or namespace under
which an entity exists, operates and is identified with a specific
identifier. The identity of an entity within that application
domain is defined as the partial identity of that entity for that
application domain. Combining all these we define a context
in terms of Identity Management in the following way:
Context - Context in Identity Management is any information
that represents the user’s partial identity (using an identifier),
the physical location from where the user tries to access any
service, the time and date of the service request and the
application domain in which the partial identity of the user is
valid (the IdP) or to where the user is requesting to access a
service (the SP).
Such information can also be regarded as the Contextual
Information or Dynamic Attributes. We will be using the
term Context, Contextual Information & Dynamic Attributes
interchangeably throughout the paper. Using this definition
of context, we can define the term Context-Aware Identity
Management in the following way:
Context-Aware Identity Management - A Context-Aware Iden-
tity Management is a specific type of Identity Management that
might use contexts for:
− registering and de-registering the partial identity (contain-
ing identifiers) of a user to an IdP.
and must use contexts:
−for highlighting, selecting and/or generating an identifier
during a specific service provisioning scenario;
− to aid users to select appropriate attributes that the user
wants to release to a specific SP;
− to aid users to select an appropriate subset of contexts to
be included as dynamic attributes along with other selected
attributes;
− for utilising them as dynamic attributes along with other
attributes during the authorisation and the service provision-
ing phase; and
− for supporting business and security applications to provide
innovative service scenarios.
V. REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS
A comprehensive set of requirements for an ideal identity
management system has been compiled in [21]. Moreover, the
nature of a context-aware service imposes some other novel
requirements. Collecting a subset of essential requirements
from [21] and combining them with the novel requirements,
we create the following set of requirements that we want to
be met by our framework:
Functional Requirements. The functional requirements out-
line the conditions that the framework must meet to ensure its
desired functionality.
F1 Online Service Integration. The framework should be
integratable with online services.
F2 Single Sign On Capability. The framework should
provide the SSO capability to allow users to access
services from different SPs of the same federation in a
seamless manner without any further logins.
F3 Indoor/Outdoor Location Tracking. The framework
should have the capability to locate users both indoor
and outdoor.
F4 Showing Required Attributes. The framework should
inform users regarding the attributes required to access
a particular service.
F5 Advanced Authorisation Capabilities. The framework
should provide advanced policy-based authorisation ca-
pabilities which will allow administrators of the SP
to write advanced yet flexible authorisation policies to
enable complex use-case scenarios.
Security Requirements.
S1 Confidentiality, Integrity, & Authenticity. Contextual
data and other user attributes should be transmitted be-
tween different entities maintaining their confidentiality
and integrity. The authenticity of contextual data should
be verifiable when required.
S2 Secure User Authentication & Authorisation. The
framework should ensure that the services can be offered
only to the securely authenticated and properly autho-
rised users.
S3 Preventing Relay Attacks. The framework should be
able to prevent any relay attack involving contextual data.
Privacy Requirements.
P1 Support for Anonymity/Pseudonymity. The framework
should allow the user to provide an anonymous or
pseudonymous identifier.
P2 Selective Disclosure. The framework should allow the
user to choose the attributes that she wants to disclose
to the SP.
P3 Explicit Consent. The framework should release at-
tributes, including contextual information, to the SP
only after the user provides her consent explicitly. The
requirements P2 and P3 will enable data transparency
and user control over their data.
The first condition in the Definition 2 has not been transformed
into a requirement since it is mostly dependent on a particular
IdP which might deploy various procedures to meet that
requirement or even might opt out from deploying it. The
above requirements have been compiled in such a way that
it meets the other conditions in Definition 2.
VI. CAFS FRAMEWORK
Designing a context-aware framework that allows federated
services would require to base the work on the concept
of context-aware identity management and should satisfy all
requirements compiled in Section V. Firstly, we will require
an IdP with the capability to provide fine-grained contextual
information as the tranditional IdP cannot provide such in-
formation. A smartphone can be an excellent choice to act
as such an IdP since the current generation of smartphones
are equipped with sensors and with the fast 3G or 4G net-
work capabilities. We have designed and developed a novel
framework to utilise contexts for federated services which
we call CAFS or Context-Aware Federated Services. The
basic idea is very similar to the existing federated architecture
with the inclusion of a novel type of IdP called Portable
Personal Identity Provider or PPIdP as proposed in [22]. The
PPIdP is a special type of IdP that is hosted in a mobile
device owned and/or used by the user. It is under the full
control of the user. The user decides what attributes should
be stored in such an IdP and selects which attributes should
be released to which SP. The architecture of PPIdP has two
Fig. 1: The architecture of PPIdP.
major components (Figure 1): the Personal Attribute Store (or
PAS) and the IdP. The PAS consists of a back-end database
to store the user attributes and a Control Panel for users to
manipulate their attributes. The current generation of smart-
phones, equipped with several sensors such as GPS Receiver,
Gyroscope, Proximity Sensor, Accelerometer, etc, can be used
to sense contextual information. The PAS can sense location
information from the GPS receiver and store them as dynamic
attributes into the back-end database. In some cases, external
sensors can be used to supplement and/or complement other
contextual information. The PAS can read such information
using the camera and then store them as dynamic attributes in
the database. The IdP component is responsible for providing
IdP services and consists of two sub-components: the Control
Panel and the IdP Context. The control panel is used to start
or stop the IdP service and the IdP context consists of several
interfaces where each interface is responsible for handling
a specific identity management protocol such as Security
Assertion Markup Language (SAML) or OpenID, etc.. The
IdP component also shares the same back-end database of
the PAS to retrieve static or dynamic attributes during the
user authentication phase. The PPIdP can be integrated with
the SP using the concept of Dynamic Federation to create
the federation in a dynamic fashion [23]. Such a federation
involving the PPIdP is called the Personal Identity Federation
(PIF) [22]. The PIF can be of two types: Type 1 and Type 2,
just like the traditional federation. The second type allows the
user to federate two IdPs (the PPIdP & a traditional IdP) by
a user of both IdPs in such a way that the user can import
some dynamic attributes from the PPIdP to the IdP and can
subsequently pass those attributes to the SPs. The middle IdP
in this setting is known as the Proxy IdP and is assumed to
be fully trusted by the SP with a mutual trust agreement. On
the other hand, the PPIdP will be considered as a semitrusted
entity (not fully trusted by another entity, see [23]) by both the
proxy IdP and the SP following the condition of the dynamic
federation as explained in [23].
The authorisation of users in the CAFS is handled by the
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML). The
XACML is an OASIS standard that defines a general-purpose
access control and authorisation system [24]. It consists of
a policy language based on XML and a processing system
that knows how to interpret the policy with respect to the
relevant application. The policy language is used to create a
policy that enlists the requirements to access a resource in
a protected environment. The major components of XACML
are: i) Policy Administration Point (PAP) which is responsible
for creating and managing all policies, ii) Policy Enforcement
Point (PEP) which is responsible for intercepting a user’s
request and enforcing an XACML decision received from the
Policy Decision Point (PDP, see below), iii) Policy Decision
Point (PDP) which is responsible for evaluating a user’s
request based on existing policies and returning an XACML
decision to the PEP and iv) Policy Information Point (PIP)
which gathers additional user attributes.
The XACML is an example of a request/response language
where a user submits a request to the PEP to access a protected
resource. The PEP generates an XACML request based on the
user attributes, the resource the user wants to access and the
action (read/write) the user wants to perform on that resource
and forwards that request to the PDP. The PDP evaluates the
existing policies to determine if the user can perform that
particular action onto that resource using supplied attributes,
creates an XACML response and returns it to the PEP. Based
on the response, the PEP approves/rejects the user’s request.
The existing XACML standard cannot utilise any location
data as conditions inside any policy. Geospatial XACML
or GeoXACML is an Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC)
(http://www.opengeospatial.org/ ) standard that has been intro-
duced as an extension to the XACML Version 2.0 to enforce
access restrictions based on geographic information [25]. The
geographic information is encoded in Geography Markup
Language (GML) [26] and can be used inside a policy as a
condition. The GeoXACML architecture has been incorporated
with the PIF architecture to complete the full architecture for
the CAFS Framework. The full architecture for CAFS using
Type 1 PIF is given in Figure 2. This architecture can be easily
extended for the Type 2 PIF as well.
A. CAFS Development
The two sub-components of the PPIdP (the PAS and the
IdP Component) have been developed as Android Apps. The
SQLite Database [27] has been used as the back-end database
to store user attributes. On top of the database, SQLCipher [28]
has been used to store attributes securely. SQLCipher provides
fast, secure and automatic 256-bit AES encryption/decryption
of SQLite database entries. Users can use the control panel
of the PAS to manually insert/update static attributes. For
dynamic attributes such as location data, the value (in the
format of the Geographic coordinate system where the val-
ues are represented with altitude, latitude and longitude) is
collected from the Android Location Service that provides
location data from the GPS Receiver, cell tower or Wi-Fi
Fig. 2: CAFS Type 1 Architecture.
signals [29]. The PAS also allows the user to set Attribute
Release Policies (ARP) that dictate what attributes should be
presented to the user during the user authentication phase. For
our current work, we have also updated the previous PAS, as
reported in [22], with the capability to retrieve information
from QRCodes using the camera (see below).
The IdP component consists of two sub-components: the IdP
Context and the Control Panel. The IdP Context is a servlet
container deployed using the Jetty Web Server [30]. It contains
several servlets which are responsible for handling respective
protocol. The current implementation of the PPIdP supports
SAML based on the Web Browser SSO Profile and HTTP
Post binding. The control panel is used to start/stop the IdP.
Once the IdP is started, the user can use the preferred web
browser of her mobile phone to access federated services.
The existing open source XACML APIs for Java such as
SunXACML [31], HERASAF XACML Core [32], enterprise-
java-xacml [33] do not provide any support for the GeoX-
ACML. There exists a commercial implementation of the
GeoXACML in http://geoxacml.secure-dimensions.net/, how-
ever, it is not open sourced. After a thorough search, we
have been able to locate an incomplete implementation of
GeoXACML in the GeoServer SVN Repository [34]. We have
exported that project and integrated it with the SunXACML
API by going through some major modifications in a number
of its classes. The combined API has finally been bundled with
the Jetty Web Server that runs on a local web server.
We have been looking for a simpler model of attribute
aggregation that does not involve complex pre-steps. After
a thorough analysis, the Identity Proxying (IP) model seems
to be a viable candidate. In this model, the SP allows the
user to aggregate attributes from multiple IdPs using a highly
trusted IdP, also known as the Proxy IdP. The trusted IdP
is federated with multiple IdPs and the SP. The federations
can be either pre-configured at the admin level or can be
federated dynamically. In this model, the user is forwarded
to the trusted IdP at first and then the trusted IdP forwards the
user to other IdPs. After the user is authenticated separately
at each IdP, she returns back to the trusted IdP with different
attributes and the trusted IdP combines all these attributes and
might supplement the combined set with its own user-attributes
and then reasserts all attributes to the SP. We have used
the SimpleSAMLphp library [35], a PHP implementation of
SAML, for implementing the IP model. Our developed proxy
IdP allows attributes to be aggregated from any SAML IdP,
however, in this paper we mostly concentrate on aggregating
attributes from the PPIdP. Apart from the aggregated attributes,
the proxy IdP also adds two pieces of information to each set
of attributes from a single IdP: the source of attributes (the
entity ID of the IdP where this set of attributes has originated)
and a trust metric for each set. We have used the NIST LoA
(Level of Assurance or Level of Authentication [36]) level
as a trust metric where Level 1 indicates attributes from a
semitrusted source and Level 2 value signifies from a highly
trusted source. A LoA value of 2 is added to each set for
attributes from a highly trusted IdP whereas a LoA value of 1
is added to each set for attributes from semitrusted IdPs (e.g.
PPIdP). These two pieces of information are provided to allow
the SP to take appropriate authorisation decisions.
VII. USE-CASES
Now we will illustrate a few use-cases to show the appli-
cability of our approach.
A. Settings
We have two SPs (denoted as SP1 and SP2 hereafter)
deployed with the SimpleSAMLphp. The PEP has been de-
veloped in PHP and integrated with each SP. Following the
SAML authentication phase when the user returns to the SP
with the assertion, the user lands on the PEP. The PEP retrieves
the attributes from the assertion, creates an XACML request
with those attributes and forwards the request to the PDP. The
PDP evaluates the user’s request using the existing policies
and returns an XACML response to the PEP. Based on the
XACML response, the user is granted or rejected by the PEP.
Each SP has a few web pages that have been protected
using the PEP. Each page has different requirements of static
attributes and contexts (dynamic attributes) that need to be
fulfilled to access that page. All these requirements have been
used as conditions inside the policies in the GeoXACML en-
vironment. Any type of contextual information can be handled
by our framework, however, the current implementation only
handles the location (indoor and outdoor), date and time, and
role as contextual information. Table I specifies the list of
attributes (static and dynamic) required for each page in the
respective SP. In the table, the value val refers to the range of
these geographic values: (55.865318, -4.267437), (55.865185,
-4.2660857), (55.864722, -4.266203), (55.864806, -4.268220).
The gte condition signifies that the user attribute should be
greater than or equal to the stated value, the equals signifies
that the user attribute should match the stated value, the within
signifies that the location of the user should be within the
specified value and the between signifies that the request
should be made during the specified duration. The value ST
or HT as the value of the idp attribute signifies that the IdP
has to be semitrusted or highly(or fully) trusted respectively.
TABLE I: Attributes required for each page.
Name Resource Attributes Cond. Values
SP1
Page1.php loa gte 1location within val
Page2.php
loa gte 1
location within val
building equals 1
floor equals 3
room equals 5
time between 14:00 - 14:30
date equals 2014-02-04
Page3.php
idp equals HT/ST
location within val
building equals 4
floor equals 5
room equals 2
time between 14:00 - 15:30
date equals 2014-02-04
loa gte 1
idp equals HT
pos equals student
org equals a
loa equals 2
SP2
Page1.php
loa gte 2
salarygrade gte 6
age gte 33
Page2.php
loa gte 2
salarygrade gte 6
age gte 33
position equals admin
The location attribute provided by the PPIdP can locate
the user externally within a certain geographical location.
However, some services or resources (as in our cases of the
Page2.php & Page3.php of SP1) might require to locate the
user internally inside a building (e.g. in a room of a particular
floor). Verbally, the requirements for accessing the Page2.php
can be expressed in this way: “a user can access Page2.php
only if she is within that geographic location and has a
loa value greater than or equal to 1 and has submitted the
request from Building 1, Floor 3, Room 5 in between 14:00
to 14:30 on 4 February 2014”. There have been a few works
to locate a user inside a building, however, the technology is
not precise yet. That is why we have adopted an alternative
approach using Dynamic QRCodes as introduced in [7], [13].
QRCode is a type of two dimensional bar codes. It can
display information in a pictorially encoded format which can
be read by a device having a digital camera and a specific
piece of software to decode that information [37]. It has
gained considerable popularities with the rise of smartphones
as most of them are capable to decode information shown via
QRCodes. The traditional QRCodes are mostly static in nature
meaning that once it is generated its contents cannot be altered.
With a computer system running in the background, we can
easily generate and display a dynamic QRCode refreshed
with new contents after a certain duration. We have adopted
this approach. The information encoded into the QRCode is:
Building Number, Floor Number, Room Number, Date and
Time. In our development, we have emulated this scenario
by developing an Android app. The assumed admin provides
the required information (Building no., Floor no., etc.). The
information is combined and then encrypted. The secret key
is shared between the app and the PEP. The user scans the
QRCode using the PAS before entering the specific room from
where she has to access the specified resource. The encrypted
information retrieved from the QRCode is saved as an attribute
to the PAS that the user must release to access that resource.
This means that users must know beforehand which attributes
they need to release to these SPs. That is why when the user
visits the homepage of the respective SP, she is informed which
attributes are needed to access any service. For accessing
the Page3.php, the user, in addition to the attributes similar
to Page2.php, will need to release the pos & org attributes
from the proxy IdP to testify that she belongs the organisation
(e.g. as a student of the university). This means that the user
will need to aggregate attributes from two SAML IdPs: the
location, building, floor, room, time and date attributes from
the PPIdP and the pos and the org attributes from a highly
trusted IdP. Here, we have assumed that the pos and the org
attributes are stored at the proxy IdP and thus will have a LoA
value of 2.
With these settings now we can discuss a few use-cases. It
is assumed that users have already federated the PPIdP with
the respective SP and with the trusted(proxy) IdP to create a
Type 1 and Type 2 PIF.
B. Use Case: SP1
The flow for accessing each page is given below:
Accessing Page1.php. The user visits the homepage of SP1.
She notes that she will need to release the location attribute
to access Page1.php. The user clicks the Page 1 button. She
is redirected to the WAYF Page of SP1. The user selects
the PPIdP. A SAML Authentication Request is sent to the
PPIdP. The user is authenticated there with her username and
password and is provided with an HTML form, known as the
consent form, containing the list of attributes. The user selects
the location attributes and clicks the Submit button. A SAML
assertion with the SAML response is sent back to the PEP. The
PEP retrieves the attributes from the SAML response. Since
the response is from an untrusted IdP, the PEP assigns a LoA
value of 1 for this response. Then an XACML request with
the location and loa attributes are sent to the PDP. The PDP
uses the existing policies to evaluate the user’s request and an
XACML response with Permit/Deny value is sent back to the
PEP and the user is granted or denied accordingly.
Accessing Page2.php & Page3.php. At this point, if the user
tries to access Page2.php, she will require additional attributes.
For that, she needs to be in that specific room of the floor in
the building from where she can access the service. Assuming
that the user is in front of that specific room (e.g. Building
1, Floor 3 and Room 5) and there is a Dynamic QRCode
displayed in front of the room, the user uses the PAS to scan
the QRCode and saves the information as an attribute, called
IntPosition, into the PAS. Then the user visits the homepage of
SP1 and clicks the Page2.php, the usual SAML protocol flow
takes place. Assuming the user is authenticated at the PPIdP,
the user is presented with an HTML form in which she chooses
to release the location & IntPosition attributes (Figure 3). A
SAML assertion with the attributes are sent back to the PEP.
Since the assertion contains the IntPosition attributes, the PEP
decrypts its value and retrieves the building, floor, room, date
& time attributes. All these attributes are used to create an
XACML request to send to the PDP. Then the usual XACML
flow takes place. If the user scans the QRCode at the right
indoor location, the user can access the Page2.php.
Fig. 3: Releasing attributes at the PPIdP.
To access Page3.php, the user needs to release attributes
from two IdPs as discussed above. At first, the user is
forwarded to the proxy IdP where she is authenticated. Then,
the user is presented with a consent form containing the user
attributes. The form also contains a button called Aggregate
More Attributes (Figure 4). If the user clicks the button, a
session with the already aggregated attributes is created and
the user is forwarded to the IdP selection page at the proxy IdP
where other SAML IdPs (including the PPIdP) linked to the
proxy IdP are listed. Assuming the user chooses the PPIdP,
she is forwarded to the PPIdP with a SAML authentication
request. After being authenticated at the PPIdP, the user is
presented with the consent form as Figure 3. The user selects
attributes and clicks the Submit button. A SAML assertion
with the attributes are returned to the proxy IdP. The proxy
IdP validates the assertion and retrieves the attributes. Then it
retrieves the previously aggregated attributes from the session
and combines both sets and presents them in the consent
form (Figure 5) with the appropriate IdP name and LoA
value for each corresponding set of attributes. The IdP name
and LoA attributes for each set are uneditable so that they
cannot be changed by the user. If the user chooses any
single attribute from a set, the IdP and the LoA value for
the corresponding set will be added to the released set of
attributes. Assuming the user chooses the required attributes
for accessing the Page3.php, an SAML response with a SAML
assertion containing the attributes will be sent back to the PEP
and the same XACML protocol flow takes places to check if
the user can access the Page3.php. Note that, the user can
access (Page1.php & Page3.php) or (Page1.php & Page2.php)
when she can access Page3.php or Page2.php respectively,
since the entities in both pair require the same value for the
common location attribute.
C. Use Case: SP2
Since the pages in the SP2 requires an LoA value of 2, the
user cannot use the PPIdP. The user visits the homepage of the
Fig. 4: The consent form at the proxy IdP.
Fig. 5: Aggregated attributes.
SP2. She notes the list of attributes that she will need to release
to access Page1.php & Page2.php (Table I). Assuming the user
clicks the Page 1 button, she is redirected to the WAYF Page of
SP2. The user selects the proxy IdP. A SAML request is sent
to the IdP where she is is authenticated and then is provided
with the consent form containing the list of attributes. The user
selects the attributes and clicks the Submit button. A SAML
assertion with the SAML response is sent back to the PEP. The
PEP retrieves the attributes from the SAML response. Then an
XACML request with the attributes is sent to the PDP. The
usual XACML flow takes place to check if the user can access
the requested page.
VIII. DISCUSSION
The whole framework has been designed and developed
with online services in mind and provides a seamless single
sign on capability across SPs in the same federation and
thereby meets requirements F1 and F2. The framework has
the ability to locate users indoor as well as outdoor and thus
meets requirement F3. To meet F4, the SP must have a way to
request attributes from the IdP. Unfortunately, the SAML does
not have any such mechanism. Therefore, we opted for the
option where our deployed SPs let users know what attributes
are needed to access a particular service and the user takes
note of such attributes. We agree that this might not be a user-
friendly option, however, given the current state of SAML,
this seems to be the only logical choice. As evident from use-
cases, CAFS supports an advanced policy-based authorisation
infrastructure XACML and thus meets the requirement F5 as
well.
The framework has been developed using SAML and
XACML standards. The communication channel in SAML is
fully encrypted. The CAFS also uses the encrypted channel
(HTTPS) to communicate with the GeoXACML environment.
It guarantees the confidentiality and integrity of information,
including contextual information, passed between involved en-
tities. The discussion regarding the authenticity of contextual
data, e.g. location, deserves further discussion since location
information can be faked in smartphones using available apps.
For example, Fake GPS location [38] and Location Spoofer
[39] are two popular Android apps for spoofing location data
for the Android platform. Therefore it is advisable to provide
location-based services in such a way so that users need to
be present there physically to avail the service thereby under-
mining the motive of spoofing location data. The alternative
approach is to deploy external sensors that can be used to prove
that the user has been near to the vicinity of the sensor at a
certain time. We have adopted this approach using dynamic
QRCodes as external sensors. To ensure that the information
retrieved from the QRCode cannot be spoofed, the information
is encrypted at first and then the QRCode is generated using
the encrypted data. Here, we have assumed that the dynamic
QRCodes are deployed by the SP and thus the SP can decrypt
and decode the encrypted QRCode to retrieve the location
data passed using the IntPosition attribute. This ensures the
authenticity of location data and thus meets S1. The CAFS
also authenticates the user securely over the HTTPS channel
and provides the services only to the authroised users which is
determined by the respective XACML policy and thus meets
S2. To prevent relay attacks, the date and time of the day are
also embedded inside the information in the QRCode. This
ensures that the QRCode cannot be used after that date and
time thereby ensuring S3.
The PPIdP and the proxy IdP generates a pseudonymous
partial identifier unique to each SP during the authentication
phase allowing users to maintain a session with a SP, however,
several SPs cannot collude to build a profile of the user. The
proxy IdP can also provide a unique identifier. This satisfies
P1. During the authentication process, the user can choose,
using the consent form, which attributes she wants to release
to that SP which users to select attributes and contextual
information, control data flow and to provide her consent while
accessing a service and hence satisfies P2 and P3.
Many services might not require any identifying informa-
tion, providing the location information would be enough to
access such services as in the case of Page1.php & Page2.php.
When the location information as well as an identifier is
required from a trusted source to offer services (based on the
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [40] or Attribute Based
Access Control (ABAC) [41]), as in the case of Page3.php,
we have adopted the attribute aggregation mechanism. The
Page3.php use-case has only illustrated the RBAC scenarios
(e.g. if the role of the user is student). However, it can be easily
adopted for scenarios requiring the user’s identifier (ABAC).
Discussion of any federated system will be incomplete with-
out analysing the trust issues involved. As we have federated
the proxy IdP and the SP in the traditional way, they trust
each other whereas the PPIdP is considered as semitrusted to
the IdP and the SP. If the authentication is delegated by the
proxy IdP to the other IdPs (as in the case of CAFS Type
2), the SP depends on the judgement of the proxy IdP. That
is, if the proxy IdP considers other IdPs as trusted then they
will be trusted by the SP and if other IdPs are considered as
semitrusted then they will be considered as semitrusted as well.
As mentioned earlier, the LoA value is used as a trust metric.
For the CAFS Type 1 architecture, any attributes released by
the PPIdP will be implicitly considered having a LoA value
of 1. For the CAFS Type 2 architecture, the proxy IdP holds
the responsibility to assign the correct LoA value.
A. Advantages
The CAFS provides several key advantages. A few of them
are highlighted below:
− CAFS is the first framework to address the context-aware
identity management in a comprehensive way focusing all
aspects of identity management and satisfying all requirements
as outlined in Section V.
− CAFS is the first framework to demonstrate how location
data can be used to provide federated services. This brings
benefits to both users and SPs as they can utilise the SSO
capability of the IdP thereby reducing the need for further
logins for each separate location-based service hosted in
different identity domains.
− The CAFS illustrates how geographical location data can
be utilised by integrating the GeoXACML API with the SAML
and the existing XACML libraries. In addition, our deployment
shows how the user can be located precisely inside a building
and how the authenticity of the location can be verified using
external sensors and the readily available sensing technologies
of smartphones.
− In addition, this is the first work to explore the possibility
of combining the attribute aggregation mechanism with the
context-aware services to formulate innovative and advanced
use-case scenarios.
Table II provides a comparative analysis of our frame-
work with existing works on context-aware services against
the set of requirements compiled in Section V. The table
provides a side-by-side comparison between our work and
other existing works. The “X” symbol has been used in the
table to signify that the particular work has considered the
respective requirement. The “x ” symbol has been used to
signify that either the system has failed to meet that respective
requirement. As evident from the table, our framework offers a
better way to access context-aware services than any existing
works considering different functional, security, privacy and
trust issues.
B. Future Work
There are a few directions to take from here:
− There are a few XACML Policy Editors such as UMU-
XACML-Editor [42], Islandora:XACML Editor 6.x [43], etc.,
none of them has any support to add geographic information
into the policy. The geographic information might contain
numerous geographic points which are hard to add manually
in the policy. It will be useful to add support for adding such
information in those editors.
− The current implementation of attribute aggregation is
based on the IP model. We are investigating how other models
can be accommodated into our implementation.
IX. CONCLUSION
As the current trend suggests, the popularity of federated
services and context-aware services will be increasing in the
upcoming years. An architecture that can provide context-
aware federated services can be advantageous for users due
to the SSO capability and thus reducing the number of online
accounts they need to manage and use to access different
services. Such services can also be advantageous for SPs as
well since it allow them to offload the burden of managing
user information by delegating these tasks to the IdP. In this
paper we present a novel framework, based on the concept
of Portable Personal Identity Provider and Personal Identity
Federation, for context-aware federated services using the
SAML, XACML and GeoXACML standards. We have also
shown how the attribute aggregation mechanism can play
a crucial role to provide innovative use-case scenarios. We
believe that our approach has huge potential. However, this is
just an introductory step toward this exciting area and we hope
that this work will excite further research in enabling users to
harness the full potential of context-aware services.
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